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ABSTRACT
Wages and Productivity Growth in a Dynamic Monopoly*
This Paper studies the intertemporal problem of a monopolistic firm that
engages in productivity-enhancing innovations to reduce its labour costs. If the
level of wages is sufficiently low, the firm’s rate of productivity growth
approaches the rate of wage growth and eventually the firm reaches a steady
state where its unit labour cost remains constant over time. Otherwise, it will
gradually reduce its innovation effort over time and ultimately terminate
production. Productivity-dependent wage differentials do not affect productivity
growth in the steady state; they increase, however, the firm’s long-run
equilibrium cost level.
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This Paper addresses the interaction between labour market conditions and
the innovative performance of firms. It studies the intertemporal problem of a
firm that engages in productivity-enhancing innovations to reduce its labour
costs. While the firm acts as a monopoly in the output market, it takes the
current competitive wage in the labour market as given. At each point in time,
the wage rate and the firm’s productivity determine its unit labour cost.
Through investments in process innovations it can raise labour productivity
and thus reduce its cost at subsequent dates. The firm thus faces a dynamic
optimization problem because innovation affects future labour costs and the
incentives for innovation depend on the evolution of these costs.
In our model it is the evolution of wages that stimulates productivity enhancing
innovations. Higher total labour costs create stronger incentives for process
innovations that raise the productivity of labour.  The innovative performance
of the firm thus depends on the growth of wages as it seeks to reduce its
labour cost by increasing labour productivity.
By formulating the firm’s innovation strategy as an infinite horizon optimization
programme we can study the long-run evolution of productivity growth when
the competitive wage increases at an exogenous rate.  As long as the firm’s
initial labour cost lies below some critical level, its rate of productivity growth
eventually approaches the rate of wage growth under the optimal innovation
policy. The firm then reaches a steady state where these two rates coincide so
that its unit labour cost remains constant over time. Interestingly, this steady
state is independent of the level of wages; it only depends on their growth
rate.
The findings in the present Paper complement our study in Bester and
Petrakis (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2031, 1998) on the relation between
wages and productivity growth in a competitive industry with free entry and
exit. The properties of the steady state in the present monopoly model are
essentially equivalent to the competitive case. There is, however, an important
difference on the adjustment path towards the steady state: in the competitive
model the current rate of innovation always depends positively on the
industry's current unit labour cost. In contrast, in the monopoly model the
optimal innovation policy does not have this characteristic. Instead, the
highest rate of innovation occurs at some intermediate level of the firm's unit
labour cost. The reason is that low costs create little incentive for cost cutting.
The same happens also when costs are rather high, because then the firm’s
output is low and so the overall gains from innovation are small.
Our analysis also addresses the role of productivity-dependent wage
differentials. Such differentials have been investigated in a number ofempirical studies and may be explained, for example, by bargaining power on
the part of the firm’s workforce. A well known theoretical argument in this
context is that a positive relation between wages and productivity reduces the
firm’s incentive for innovations increasing productivity. The idea is that the firm
cannot realize the full gain from its investment in innovation when it anticipates
that its labour force will capture some share of the rents from technological
improvements.
Our dynamic analysis reveals that rent sharing has some quite different long-
run effects. Indeed, the firm’s steady state rate of innovation is independent of
the degree of rent sharing. This is so because in the steady state the rate of
productivity growth equals the rate of wage growth and the ratio of the firm’s
wage to the competitive wage remains constant over time. The higher the
degree of rent sharing, however, the higher the firm’s long-run equilibrium cost
level. Also, rent sharing decreases the critical value of the initial cost, above
which the firm cannot survive in the market in the long run.
One might extend our model by considering dynamic imperfectly competitive
markets.  In an intertemporal model where at each date firms compete on
prices or quantities it will be interesting to analyse how strategic interactions
between the firms affect productivity growth in the short run and in the long
run.  Stimulated by the work of Schumpeter, a large part of the literature on
R&D relates the pace of innovative activity to market structure.  An imperfect
competition version of our model could combine this approach with our cost–
push argument.1
1 Introduction
This paper studies the intertemporal problem of a ﬁrm that engages in pro-
ductivity enhancing innovations to reduce its labor costs. While the ﬁrm
acts as a monopoly in the output market, it takes the current competitive
wage in the labor market as given. At each point in time, the wage rate and
the ﬁrm’s productivity determine its unit labor cost. Through investments
in process innovations it can raise productivity and thus reduce its cost at
subsequent dates. This generates a dynamic optimization problem because
innovation aﬀects future labor costs and the incentives for innovation depend
on the evolution of these costs.
We formulate this problem as an inﬁnite horizon optimization programme.
In this way we can study the long–run evolution of productivity growth when
the competitive wage increases at an exogenous rate. It turns out that the
monopoly’s long–run behavior depends critically on the initial level of its
labor cost. If this level is too high, it will gradually reduce its innovation
eﬀort over time. Ultimately its cost becomes too high to operate proﬁtably
and so it will terminate production. The more interesting case prevails when
the initial cost lies below the critical level. In this case the rate of productivity
growth approaches the rate of wage growth under the optimal innovation
policy. Eventually, the ﬁrm reaches a steady state where these two rates
coincide so that its unit labor cost remains constant over time. Interestingly,
this steady state is independent of the level of wages; it only depends on
their growth rate. The level of wages determines only whether the optimal
policy tends towards the steady state or whether the ﬁrm will go extinct in
the long–run.
In our model it is the evolution of wages that stimulates productivity en-
hancing innovations at the ﬁrm level. Our cost push argument addresses the
interaction between labor market conditions and the innovative performance
of industries and countries. This interaction is the subject of a number of
empirical studies both at the macroeconomic (see e.g. Gordon (1987)) and
the microeconomic level (see e.g. Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), Chennells
and Van Reenen (1997), Mohnen et. al. (1986) and Van Reenen (1996)). An2
important theoretical insight in this context is Grout’s (1984) analysis, who
argues that the ﬁrm’s labor force will capture some share of the rents from
technological improvements. This in turn will reduce the ﬁrm’s incentives to
innovate.1
We address the issue of rent sharing in Section 5, where we endogenize
the ﬁrm’s wage rate by introducing productivity dependent wage diﬀeren-
tials. These may reﬂect the employees’ bargaining power within the ﬁrm.
In contrast with Grout’s (1984) static model, our dynamic analysis reveals
that rent sharing has some quite diﬀerent long–run eﬀects. Indeed, the ﬁrm’s
steady state rate of innovation is independent of the degree of rent sharing.
This is so because in the steady state the rate of productivity growth equals
the rate of wage growth and the ratio of the ﬁrm’s wage to the competitive
wage remains constant over time. The higher the degree of rent sharing,
however, the higher is the ﬁrm’s long–run equilibrium cost level. Also, rent
sharing decreases the critical value of the initial cost, above which the ﬁrm
will eventually quit operating at some point in the future.
This paper complements our study in Bester and Petrakis (1998) of the
relation between wages and productivity growth in a competitive industry
with free entry and exit where the last period’s best technology is freely
available to any ﬁrm.2 Also in the competitive framework it is the growth
rate of wages that determines the industry’s long–run behavior. There are,
however, some important diﬀerences between the competitive case and the
present model. First, under perfect competition the individual ﬁrm does not
face a truly dynamic optimization problem to determine its optimal inno-
vation policy. This is so because free entry and exit, and free availability
of last period’s best technology imply that a ﬁrm’s future proﬁts are zero,
independently of its innovation decision. Second, and more importantly, un-
der perfect competition the individual ﬁrm does not have to consider the
impact of its production cost on the output price. Therefore, there is a posi-
1Ulph and Ulph (1994) argue, however, that union bargaining power and innovative
investments may be positively related.
2An extension of our study towards a general equilibrium model is presented in Hellwig
and Irmen (1999).3
tive relation between the incentive for innovation and the current cost level.
This is no longer the case in the present monopoly model or, more generally,
under imperfect competition. Instead, under the optimal policy the relation
between R&D investment and current cost has an inverted U-shape: When
the monopoly’s cost are relatively low, there is little incentive to reduce these
costs even further. Also relatively high costs, however, reduce the gains from
cost reduction because of the low output associated with a high monopoly
price. As a result, the monopoly’s highest innovation eﬀort occurs for some
intermediate level of labor costs and its adjustment path towards the steady
state may not be monotone.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ﬁrm’s inﬁnite
horizon optimization problem. The steady state solutions of this problem
are derived in Section 3. Section 4 analyses the adjustment dynamics of
the optimal innovation policy. The impact of productivity dependent wage
diﬀerentials is studied in Section 5. Section 6 presents conclusions. All proofs
are relegated to the Appendix in Section 7.
2 The Model
Our model depicts the evolution of labor productivity in a dynamic monopoly.
Time is discrete and at each date t = 0,1,2..., the monopolist employs labor
in combination with other inputs to produce a single good. Also, he engages
in process innovation to increase labor productivity. His innovation behavior
at date t determines his technology at the subsequent date. The incentive
for reducing labor costs through productivity enhancing innovations depends
on the intertemporal path of wages. We ﬁrst analyse the evolution of pro-
ductivity under the assumption that the wage rate is exogenous and that the
monopolist takes the going rate as given. Later, in Section 5 we consider the
possibility of productivity dependent wage diﬀerentials, which may reﬂect
the employees’ bargaining power within the ﬁrm.
More formally, the model is speciﬁed as follows. At each date the monop-
olist faces the inverse demand function P(x) and so his revenue is R(x) ≡
P(x)x. To produce x units of output at date t, he has to invest the amount4
C(x) in inputs other than labor. The required labor input is x/at, where at
is the ﬁrm’s labor productivity at date t.
The ﬁrm can engage in labor productivity enhancing process innovation.
We assume that it can increase current productivity by the factor (1+q) by
spending the amount K(q). Thus, if at describes the technology available at
date t, labor productivity at t + 1 becomes
at+1 = (1 + qt)at (1)
if the amount K(qt) is spent on innovations. Let K(0) = 0,K0(0) = 0,K0(∞)
= ∞ and K0(q) > 0, K00(q) > 0 for all q > 0. The initial level of productivity
a0 = ¯ a0 is exogenous.
The exogenous wage rate wt grows at the rate γ > 0 so that wt+1 = (1 +
γ)wt, with w0 = ¯ w0 > 0. One possible interpretation is that γ represents the
average growth rate of labor productivity in the entire economy. Therefore,
also wages grow at the rate γ in the equilibrium of the economy - wide labor
market. Since the ﬁrm under consideration constitutes only a small part of
the whole economy, its impact on the equilibrium wage rate is negligible.
Let ct ≡ wt/at. Then, after investing K(q) at date t, the ﬁrm’s labor cost





The ﬁrm’s sales proﬁt Π depends on its unit labor cost according to
Π(c) ≡ max
x R(x) − C(x) − cx. (3)
We assume that R(x) − C(x) is strictly concave and R(0) ≥ C(0),R0(0) >
C0(0) and R0(∞) < C0(∞). Therefore, the proﬁt maximizing output x∗(c)
is uniquely determined and continuous in c. Moreover, x∗(c) positive and
strictly decreasing in c as long as c is not too large. Notice that, by the
envelope theorem, we have Π0(c) = −x∗(c).
For our analysis the shape of the function −Π0(c)c = x∗(c)c is crucial.
To guarantee that this function is well–behaved we make the following as-
sumption:5
Assumption 1 [R0(x)−C0(x)]x is strictly quasi–concave whenever P(x) > 0.
Moreover, [R0(x) − C0(x)]x → 0 as x → 0.
This assumption is satisﬁed for standard cost and demand functions: For
instance, R0(x)x is strictly concave if P(x) is linear or if it is iso–elastic
with a price elasticity of demand larger than unity. In addition, −C0(x)x is
concave if C(x) = k xω with k > 0 and ω ≥ 1. Furthermore, also the second
part of Assumption 1 is satisﬁed by these demand and cost functions.
Lemma 1 There is a cm > 0 such that −Π0(c)c is increasing in c if c < cm. If
c > cm and Π(c) > 0, then −Π0(c)c is decreasing in c. Moreover, −Π0(0) < ∞
and −Π0(c)c → 0 for c → ∞.







For a given discount factor δ, this condition is satisﬁed if the growth rate γ of
wages is suﬃciently small. As we show in the proof of Proposition 1 below,
this assumption ensures that for values of c in the neighborhood of cm the
monopolist chooses an innovation rate q > γ.
Example In what follows we illustrate our analysis by the following speciﬁ-
cation of our model. Let
P(x) = A − x, C(x) = x
2, K(q) = q
2. (5)














because −Π0(c)c attains its maximum at cm = A/2. ♦6
We can now state the monopolist’s intertemporal problem of choosing an











ct, c0 = ¯ c0. (9)




can view (8) as an optimal control problem. This has a single state variable
c, a single control q, an inﬁnite horizon and is autonomous. Therefore, the
optimal innovation policy may also be described by a function q∗(c) with the
interpretation that the monopolist optimally chooses q∗
t = q∗(ct) when his
unit labor cost at t equals ct.
3 Steady States
To derive the optimal innovation policy q∗(·) we employ the technique of
dynamic programming. Let V (c) denote the value function associated with
problem (8). Thus, at date t the monopolist’s present value of proﬁts under
the optimal policy is V (ct) when his current unit cost is ct. The Bellman
equation for problem (8) is
















We assume that V (·) is continuously diﬀerentiable. The optimal innovation














By the envelope theorem we obtain from (10) that
V
0(c) = Π










In what follows we characterize the optimal policy q∗(·) by examining the
implications of conditions (11) and (12).
The optimal innovation policy determines the dynamic path of the mo-










We ﬁrst look at the possible steady state values of c∗
t. These values are the
candidates for the long–run level of the ﬁrm’s wage–productivity ratio. In a
steady state, c∗
t is stationary over time and so c∗
t = ˆ c for all t. Obviously, (13)
implies that ˆ cI = 0 always constitutes a steady state for the evolution of c∗
t.
In this steady state the ﬁrm requires no labor input and so its optimal policy
trivially satisﬁes q∗(ˆ cI) = 0. More relevant are the steady states in which ˆ c
is positive. By (13) this requires q∗(ˆ c) = γ. In such a steady state, the ﬁrm
matches the growth rate of wages by the rate of productivity growth so that
its labor cost per unit of output remains constant.






0(ˆ c)ˆ c = K
0(γ)(1 + γ). (14)
By Lemma 1 and (4) this equation has exactly two solutions, ˆ cII and ˆ cIII.
Moreover, 0 < ˆ cII < cm < ˆ cIII.
It is easy to see how the values ˆ cII and ˆ cIII change with the parameters
of the model. Since Π(c) is independent of δ and γ and K00 > 0, by Lemma
1 and (14), we observe that b cII increases with growth rate of wages and
decreases with the monopolist’s discount factor, while b cIII decreases with γ
and increases with δ.






















provided δ satisﬁes (7). We can interpret A as a measure of market size.
Thus b cII increases with growth rate of wages and decreases with the market
size and the discount factor, while b cIII decreases with γ and increases with
A and δ. ♦
We now prove that c ∈ {ˆ cII,ˆ cIII} implies q∗(c) = γ to establish the
following result:
Proposition 1 The optimal policy satisﬁes q∗(c) = γ if and only if c ∈
{ˆ cII,ˆ cIII}.
Interestingly, there are two steady state values for the ﬁrm’s wage–produc-
tivity ratio where the monopolist has the same incentive to spend on labor
productivity enhancing innovation. The intuition is as follows. Obviously,
the ﬁrm has a stronger direct incentive to invest in productivity enhancing
activities at the steady state b cIII where the unit labor costs are higher. Note,
however, that at b cIII the monopolist produces a lower output than at the low
wage–productivity steady state b cII, i.e. x∗(b cII) > x∗(b cIII). Hence, any given
unit labor cost savings apply to a larger output at the low wage–productivity
steady state. Therefore, the monopolist has a stronger indirect incentive to
invest in productivity enhancing activities at the steady state b cII. This latter
output eﬀect counterbalances the direct eﬀect, and the monopolist has the
same incentive for innovation in the two steady states b cII and b cIII.
4 Innovation Dynamics




three steady states, in which c∗
t and q∗
t remain constant over time. Typically,
however, the initial value ¯ c0 of the monopolist’s wage–productivity ratio will
only accidentally coincide with one of the three steady state values, ˆ cI,ˆ cII
and ˆ cIII. In general c∗
t will evolve over time until it possibly reaches one of
the steady states. From the theory of dynamic optimization it is well-known
that the optimal path of c∗
t is monotone, i.e. the sign of c∗
t+1 −c∗
t is the same




ˆ cIII ˆ cII ˆ cI
--     - -
Figure 1: The Optimal Innovation Policy
We ﬁrst consider the optimal policy q∗(c) for values of c in the interval
(ˆ cII, ˆ cIII). It turns out that for this intermediate range the monopolist has
a strong incentive for cost reductions:
Proposition 2 The optimal policy satisﬁes q∗(c) > γ for all c ∈ (ˆ cII,ˆ cIII).
Within the range c ∈ (ˆ cII,ˆ cIII), the monopoly chooses an innovation
rate that exceeds the growth rate of wages. This means that c∗
t decreases
monotonically over time when the initial value ¯ c0 happens to lie between ˆ cII
and ˆ cIII. For intermediate values of wage–productivity ratio, the monopolist
has a strong incentive to invest in labor productivity enhancing activities.
Not only its unit labor cost is not too low so that the direct innovation
incentive is strong. But also the ﬁrm’s output is high enough to induce a
strong indirect incentive to invest in cost reduction. In summary, both the
direct eﬀect and the output eﬀect are rather strong for intermediate values
of c.
For values of c for which Proposition 2 does not apply, wages will grow
faster than productivity under the optimal policy:
Proposition 3 The optimal policy satisﬁes q∗(c) < γ for all c / ∈ [ˆ cII,ˆ cIII].10
Figure 1 summarizes our results. For any starting point ¯ c0 in the range
(0,ˆ cII), the ﬁrm’s wage–productivity ratio c∗
t ultimately approaches ˆ cII. On
the optimal path c∗
t increases monotonically over time because for each t one
has q∗(c∗
t) < γ. Also when ¯ c0 is in the interval (ˆ cII,ˆ cIII), c∗
t approaches ˆ cII
in the long–run. On such a path, however, c∗
t decreases over time because
q∗(c∗
t) > γ. If ¯ c0 exceeds the critical value ˆ cIII, the ﬁrm will become eventually
extinct under the optimal policy, which satisﬁes q∗(c∗
t) < γ. On this path, the
monopoly’s labor cost increases over time and so its output decreases until
it ultimately equals zero.
Unless ¯ c0 > ˆ cIII, the rate of productivity growth converges to the rate of
wage growth. The long–run behavior of the monopoly’s innovation strategy
is thus independent of its initial productivity ¯ a0 and the level of the wage rate
¯ w0. It is not the level of wages but the growth rate of wages that eventually
determines the monopoly’s innovation behavior and its wage–productivity
ratio in the steady state ˆ cII. In this steady state, also the ﬁrm’s output
x∗(ˆ cII) and its price P(x∗(ˆ cII)) are constant and do not depend on the wage
level. This level, however, has a profound eﬀect on the long–run level of
employment: As ˆ cII is constant, a one percent increase in ¯ w0 raises the long–
run level of labor productivity by one percent. Since the steady state output
x∗(ˆ cII) is not aﬀected, employment falls by one percent. In other words,
the monopoly’s long–run elasticity of labor demand with respect to the wage
level equals minus unity.
Recall that the higher the exogenous growth rate of wages γ is, the higher
is the steady state value of wage–productivity ratio b cII and the lower is the
steady state value b cIII. Therefore, as γ increases, the range of parameters
for which the ﬁrm will become eventually extinct becomes larger. Moreover,
for the rest of the parameter values, the higher the growth rate of wages
γ is, the higher is the monopolist’s long–run wage–productivity ratio b cII.
The monopolist will thus face a higher unit cost of labor in the long–run in
economies where wages grow faster. The monopolist’s output will then be
lower and his price higher in the long–run. Further, as labor productivity will
increase faster in the steady state, the monopolist’s demand for labor will
decrease faster in the long–run. Similarly, the ﬁrm’s adjustment behavior11
depends on its discount factor δ and the size of the market: If demand is
relatively weak or the discount factor relatively high, it is more likely that the
ﬁrm eventually becomes extinct. Also, it faces a higher wage–productivity
ratio in the long–run if it is optimal to stay in the market forever.
5 Productivity Dependent Wages
Our analysis has so far considered a monopoly that pays the competitive
wage rate to its labor force. It is often argued, however, that there is some
sharing of the rents from innovation between workers and ﬁrms. For instance,
if wage determination is the result of bargaining between a ﬁrm and a union,
the wage will be positively related to the ﬁrm’s productivity.3
To investigate the impact of productivity dependent wages on the mo-
nopoly’s optimal innovation strategy, we now consider the case where the
ﬁrm speciﬁc wage wt depends on the competitive wage ˜ wt and current labor
productivity at according to
wt = α ˜ wt + β at. (16)
We assume α > 0, β > 0 and β/(1 − α) ≥ ˜ wt/at so that wt ≥ ˜ wt. The
factor β reﬂects the extent to which the employees beneﬁt from the ﬁrm’s
productivity. In a wage bargaining model, it is positively related to the
union’s bargaining power.
Example In the right–to–manage model of wage bargaining the ﬁrm chooses
the output x∗(ct) after the wage rate wt has been determined. Therefore
its employment equals x∗(wt/at)/at. The union’s payoﬀ at date t may be
speciﬁed as U(wt) = (wt − ˜ wt)x∗(wt/at)/at. Suppose that at each date the
ﬁrm and the union bargain about the current wage so that wt is determined




3See e.g. Grout (1984). For a survey of wage bargaining models with trade unions see
e.g. Booth (1995), Ulph and Ulph (1990), Layard et al. (1991). An empirical analysis
can be found in Van Reenen (1996).12
where r ∈ (0,1] indicates the union’s bargaining power. For the speciﬁcation








which is of the same form as equation (16). ♦





As before, we assume that the competitive wage grows at the rate γ so that
˜ wt+1 = (1+γ)˜ wt. If at date t the ﬁrm increases future labor productivity by
the factor qt, its labor cost per unit of output at the subsequent date is
ct+1 = α
˜ wt(1 + γ)
at(1 + qt)
+ β, (20)
By combining (19) and (20) it becomes apparent that the factor β aﬀects the
evolution of ct according to




Ceteris paribus, ct+1 increases with β if qt > γ. This is so because the ﬁrm’s
workforce captures some share of the gains from cost reduction. Conversely,
the available rents decrease if qt < γ because then ct+1 > ct. In this case, ct+1
and β are negatively related.
When wages depend on the ﬁrm’s productivity, the monopoly’s innovation
behavior takes into account the eﬀect of productivity changes on its wage
cost. Thus equation (21) replaces constraint (9) in the monopoly’s problem
(8). As in the previous analysis of this problem, the critical steady states of
the state variable c are those where q∗(ˆ c) = γ so that c∗
t+1 = c∗
t if c∗
t = ˆ c.
Analogously to equations (11) and (12), it is straightforward to show that
such a ˆ c must satisfy
−δ V
0(ˆ c)[ˆ c − β] = (1 + γ)K
0(γ), V
0(ˆ c) = Π
0(ˆ c) + δ V
0(ˆ c). (22)13





0(ˆ c)[ˆ c − β] = K0(γ)(1 + γ). (23)
Similarly to (14), for β not too large and γ suﬃciently small this equation has
exactly two solutions, ˆ cII(β) and ˆ cIII(β). Clearly, for β = 0 these solutions
coincide with the state states ˆ cII and ˆ cIII in the foregoing analysis.





















are the two solutions of equation (23). ♦
By Lemma 1 we get immediately the following result:
Proposition 4 The steady state value ˆ cII(β) is increasing in β, and the
steady state value ˆ cIII(β) is decreasing in β.
Proposition 4 describes the impact of β on the ﬁrm’s long–run behav-
ior. The properties of the optimal policy q∗(c) are analogous to the re-
sults in Propositions 2 and 3: In the interval (ˆ cII(β),ˆ cIII(β)) it is the case
that q∗(c) > γ while q∗(c) < γ for all values of c / ∈ [ˆ cII(β),ˆ cIII(β)]. On
the adjustment path, the dependence of wages on productivity tends to re-
duce the ﬁrm’s investment in cost reduction: Since the length of the interval
(ˆ cII(β),ˆ cII(β)) decreases with β, this factor is negatively related to the range
of c–values where q∗(c) > γ. The intuition is simply that sharing the pro-
ductivity gains with its employees reduces the ﬁrm’s innovation incentive.
By the same argument, ˆ cIII(β) < ˆ cIII so that productivity dependent wages
reduce the range of initial values ¯ c0 that allow the ﬁrm to survive in the
long–run.




towards (ˆ cII(β), γ). In this case, rent sharing between the monopoly and its14
labor force does not aﬀect the long–run rate of productivity growth and the
long–run innovation eﬀort K(γ). On the optimal path, the ﬁrm speciﬁc wage
w eventually grows at the same rate as the competitive wage ˜ w and so the
relative wage diﬀerential w/˜ w remains constant over time. Because of this
diﬀerential, the monopoly’s long–run labor cost ˆ cII(β) is positively related
to the factor β. Since Π0(c) < 0, its proﬁt in the steady state ˆ cII(β) depends
negatively on β.
Consider, for instance, a unionized ﬁrm where bargaining between the
monopolist and the union determines the wage rate. Our analysis then pre-
dicts the following: First, long–run productivity growth does not depend on
the union’s bargaining power; it is simply determined by the growth rate of
the competitive wage. Second, as the union’s power increases, the critical
value of the initial wage for which the monopolist is able to survive in the
market is lowered. Finally, as the union’s claims over productivity rents in-
crease, the monopolist’s long–run unit labor cost increases, and output and
proﬁts decrease. Hence, due to the presence of the union, the ﬁrm is more
likely to become unproﬁtable over time and to leave the market. Moreover,
even when it remains proﬁtable, its long–run unit labor costs are higher and
its output is lower than in a non–unionized ﬁrm.
6 Conclusions
Modern industrialized countries are characterized by rapid technical progress
accompanied with substantial increases in real wages. We have shown that,
in a dynamic monopolistic industry, the ﬁrm optimally invests each period
in productivity enhancing innovations to counterbalance increasing wages.
Our analysis presents a dynamic cost–push argument of productivity growth.
Higher current labor costs create stronger incentives for process innovations
that raise the productivity of labor in future periods. If the level of wages is
too high, the monopolist is unable to survive in the market in the long–run.
It will gradually reduce its innovation eﬀort over time and ultimately will exit
the market. If, however, the wage level is suﬃciently low, the monopolist’s
rate of productivity growth monotonically approaches the growth rate of15
wages and eventually the ﬁrm reaches a steady state where its unit cost
of labor remains constant over time. Interestingly, long–run productivity
growth only depends on the growth rate of wages and is thus independent of
the initial level of wages. The latter only determines whether the monopolist
will be able to survive, or not, in the market. While the monopolist’s unit
labor cost as well as its output in the long–run depend only on the growth
rate of wages, the long–run levels of labor productivity and employment are
determined by the initial level of wages.
We have also analyzed the case where the rents stemming from productiv-
ity enhancing innovations are shared between the monopolist and its workers.
Surprisingly, also in this case the long–run productivity growth only depends
on the growth rate of wages and is independent of the share of proﬁts over
which the workers have claims (measured e.g. by the union’s power). Hence,
unionization does not inﬂuence long–run productivity growth, despite the
fact that it depresses the short–run incentives for innovation. The union’s
bargaining power, however, determines the monopolist’s long–run unit cost
of labor as well as its likelihood of survival in the market. When union power
is high, the monopolist can survive in the market only if the initial level of
wages is low enough. If, however, the monopolist’s optimal policy is to stay
in the market forever, then its long–run unit cost of labor is the higher, the
higher the union’s power is.
Our model could be extended to consider dynamic imperfectly competi-
tive markets. In an intertemporal model where at each date ﬁrms compete
in prices or quantities it will be interesting to analyze how strategic interac-
tions between the ﬁrms aﬀect productivity growth in the short–run and in
the long–run. Stimulated by the work of Schumpeter (1947), a large part
of the literature on R&D relates the pace of innovative activity to market
structure. An imperfect competition version of our model could combine this
approach with our cost-push argument.16
7 Appendix
This appendix contains the proof of Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 – 3.
Proof of Lemma 1: When the optimal output x∗(c) is positive, the ﬁrst









Since x∗(c) < ∞, one has −Π0(0) = x∗(0) < ∞. For c → ∞ one has x∗(c) →
0. Therefore, the second part of Assumption 1 and (25) imply that −Π0(c)c →
0 for c → ∞.
For c suﬃciently small x∗(c) > 0 and so −Π0(c)c > 0. Since −Π0(c)c → 0
for c → 0 and for c → ∞, the function −Π0(c)c attains a maximum for
some 0 < cm < ∞. Since x∗(c) is strictly decreasing, Assumption 1 and (25)
imply that cm is unique and that −Π0(c)c is increasing in c for c < cm and
decreasing in c for c > cm as long as Π(c) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Since we have already shown that q∗(c) = γ
implies c ∈ {ˆ cII,ˆ cIII}, it remains to show that the equation q∗(c) = γ has







for all c. Since K00 > 0, this equation has a unique solution q∗(c) for all c.
Moreover, by continuity of V 0(·) and Π0(·) the optimal policy q∗(·) is contin-
uous.
We ﬁrst show that q∗(cm) > γ. Note that by (26) we have −V 0(c)c ≥


























m)) ≤ (1 + γ)K
0(γ).
As q∗(cm) increases from 0 to γ, the term [(1 + γ)cm]/[1 + q∗(cm)] decreases
from cm(1+γ) to cm. By Lemma 1, −Π0(c)c is decreasing in c over the interval17
[cm,cm(1 + γ)]. Accordingly, the ﬁrst term (27) is increasing in q∗(cm) over












m(1 + γ))(1 + γ)c
m. (28)
This in combination with (27) yields
−δ Π
0 (c
m(1 + γ))(1 + γ)c
m ≤ (1 + γ)K
0(γ), (29)
a contradiction to assumption 4. This proves that q∗(cm) > γ.
Next we show that q∗(¯ c) < γ for some ¯ c > cm. Suppose the contrary.
Then q∗(c) ≥ γ and so by (10)







for all c suﬃciently large. Note that Π(c) → 0 as c → ∞. Moreover, we have
q∗(c) < ∞ for all c, because K(∞) = ∞. Therefore, (30) implies




a contradiction. This proves that q∗(¯ c) < γ for some ¯ c > cm.
Since q∗(0) = 0, q∗(cm) > γ and q∗(¯ c) < γ for some ¯ c > cm, continuity
of q∗(·) implies that there is a ˆ cII ∈ (0,cm) such that q∗(ˆ cII) = γ and a
ˆ cIII > cm such that q∗(ˆ cIII) = γ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that the sign of q∗(c) − γ cannot change
over some interval [c0,c00] if this interval does not contain a steady state.
Otherwise, one would obtain a contradiction to the fact that the optimal
trajectory c∗
t is monotone. By Proposition 1, therefore, the sign of q∗(c) − γ
is constant over the interval c ∈ (ˆ cII,ˆ cIII). The proof of Proposition 1 shows
that q∗(cm) > γ. Since cm ∈ (ˆ cII,ˆ cIII), this proves that q∗(c) > γ for all
c ∈ (ˆ cII,ˆ cIII). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: By the same argument as in the proof of Propo-
sition 2, the sign of q∗(c) − γ cannot change over the interval c ∈ [0,ˆ cII)
or the interval (ˆ cIII,∞). Therefore it is suﬃcient to show that each interval18
contains a c0 such that q∗(c0) < γ. Clearly, this is the case for the interval
[0,ˆ cII) because q∗(0) = 0.
Now consider the interval (ˆ cIII,∞). The proof of Proposition 1 shows
that q∗(¯ c) < γ for some ¯ c > cm. Since Proposition 2 shows that q∗(c) > γ
for all c ∈ (ˆ cII,ˆ cIII), it must be the case that ¯ c > ˆ cIII. Therefore also the
interval (ˆ cIII,∞) contains a c0 such that q∗(c0) < γ. Q.E.D.19
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